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NOTES
Winning the Battle, Losing the War?: Judicial
Scrutiny of Prisoners' Statutory Claims Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act
Christopher J. Burke
INTRODUCTION

When he was convicted in 1994 of drunken driving, escape, and re
sisting arrest, Ronald Yeskey was sentenced to serve 18 to 36 months
in a Pennsylvania prison.1 In addition, the judge recommended that
Yeskey be sent to a motivational boot camp operated by the state.2
Upon successful completion of the boot camp program, Yeskey's sen
tence would then be reduced to six months.3 Although he eagerly
wanted to participate, the prison refused him entrance into the boot
camp program because of his history of hypertension, and also denied
him admission into an alternative program for the disabled.4 As a re
sult, he was incarcerated for two years and two months longer than he
might have been had he successfully completed the boot camp.5 Yes
key filed suit in federal court, charging that prison authorities had
violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)6
by discriminating against him due to his physical condition.7

1. See Jack Torry, Does ADA Include Inmates? Court Hears Case of City Man Who
Says Disability Caused Longer Term, PITrsBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 29, 1998, at AS.

2 See id.

3. See id.
4. See Tina Schatz, Inmates Win One in Court but
PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg, PA), June 21, 1998, at A5.
5.

Lose One in Legislat11re, SUNDAY

See Torry, supra note 1 .

6. 4 2 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 {1994). Congress passed the ADA with the purpose to
"provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrintlnation
against individuals with disabilities" and to "provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing discrintlnation against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101
(b ){1)-(2). The Act defined a disability with respect to an individual, as "a physical or men
tal impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such indi
vidual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
Title II of the Act, the focus of Ronald Yeskey's suit, gives rise to the bulk of prisoner
ADA litigation. See Ira P. Robbins, George Bush's America Meets Dante's Inferno: The
Americans with Disabilities Act in Prison, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 49, 76 (1996). Title II
states that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be ex
cluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs or activities
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On June 15, 1998, that suit reached the Supreme Court. In
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey8 the Court resolved

a long-running circuit split in holding that Title II of the ADA applies
to inmates in state prisons.9 The Court concluded that Ronald
Yeskey's claim under the Act should not have been barred due to his
status as a prisoner.10
The Yeskey decision promises to have far-reaching legal conse
quences. It has prompted many commentators to predict a flood of
lawsuits from disabled prisoners.11 The Court's ruling was lauded by
of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
Until Yeskey's case was decided by the Supreme Court, it had been unclear whether state
prisons fell under the statutory definition of a public entity.
7. See Yeskey v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 118 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir.
1997).[hereinafter Yeskey 1] (summarizing the circuit split on this issue).
8. 118 S. Ct. 1952 (1998) [hereinafter Yeskey 11].
9. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia confirmed that such prisons fall
"squarely" within the definition of a "public entity" for purposes of the ADA. See Yeskey
II, supra note 8, 118 S. Ct. at 1953-54. In doing so, he rejected petitioner's claims that the
phrase "benefits of the services, programs or activities of a public entity," 42 U.S.C. § 12132,
created an ambiguity because state prisons do not provide prisoners with "benefits" of "pro
grams, services or activities" as those terms are usually understood. See Yeskey II, supra
note 8, 118 S. Ct. at 1955. The Court found instead that "[m]odem prisons provide inmates
with many recreational 'activities,' medical 'services,' and educational and vocational 'pro
grams,' all of which at least theoretically 'benefit' the prisoners." Yeskey II, supra note 8,
118 S. Ct. at 1955.
The Court also disagreed with petitioner's claim that the description of a " 'qualified in
dividual with a disability' " under Title II, which requires the individual to meet " 'the essen
tial eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or ac
tivities provided by a public entity' " was ambiguous relative to state prisoners. See Yeskey
II, supra note 8, 118 S. Ct. at 1955. The Court rejected the idea that the words " 'eligibility' "
or " 'participation' " implied voluntariness on the part of an applicant under the Act, and
thus would not include prisoners who are being held against their will. See Yeskey II, supra
note 8, 118 S. Ct. at 1955. The Court held that the definitions of these words "do not con
note voluntariness." Yeskey II, supra note 8, 118 S. Ct. at 1955.
10. Unfortunately for Yeskey himself, the inmate was unable to personally benefit from
the fruits of the litigation he began. By the time his case was listed for submission in the
Third Circuit, only a short time remained on his sentence. See Yeskey I, supra note 7, 118
F.3d at 169. Ultimately he was released in October of 1996 after serving 36 months in
Greensburg prison in western Pennsylvania and is now a construction worker in the Pitts
burgh region. See Torry, supra note 1.
11. See, e.g., Laurie Asseo, Justices Declare Federal Disabilities Act Protects Prison In
mates, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ), June 16, 1998, at 7 (" 'I expect a lot of creative litiga
tion on the part of prisoners,' said Kent Scheidegger of the Criminal Justice Legal Founda
tion, which supported Pennsylvania officials' appeal. 'We're now opening another
floodgate.' "); Barrie Tabin, Unanimous Supreme Court Says ADA Applies to Prison In
mates, NATION'S CrTIEs WKLY., June 22, 1998, at 1 ("As a result of the Court's ruling, such
fundamental decisions as allocating jobs in prison industries, spaces in educational and voca
tional training programs, recreational opportunities, and other institutional privileges are
likely to prompt costly and fact intensive lawsuits second-guessing the decisions of prison
administrators."); Steven Walters, Federal Disabilities Act Covers State Inmates,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 16, 1998, at 8 ("The high court's conclusion that the ADA
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others as a victory for the disabled prison population, as it may pro
vide a mechanism for inmates to improve correctional conditions re
garding diverse issues, such as the physical protection of disabled in
mates12 or the reform of prison healthcare systems.13 Yet for all of the
fanfare it received, Yeskey failed to address an equally consequential
issue that has the potential to blunt the force of the Supreme Court's
ruling significantly: the level of judicial scrutiny that prisoners' ADA
claims should receive.
Prior to 1987, Procunier v. Martinez14 was the Supreme Court's
most significant decision regarding the scrutiny afforded to alleged
violations of prisoners' constitutional rights. In Procunier, the Court
held that censorship of prisoner mail would only be justified if the
regulation or practice in question furthered "an important or substan
tial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression,"
and if "the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [were] no greater
than [was] necessary or essential to the protection of the particular
governmental interest involved."15 This type of review is similar to the
kind of "heightened scrutiny" that classifications based on gender re
ceive - those that will not be upheld unless they are "substantially
related to a sufficiently important governmental interest."16
Yet in a 1987 case, Turner v. Safley, 17 the Court made it more diffi
cult for a prisoner to succeed with a claim that his or her constitutional

covers state prisons disposes of a major impediment to those suits and is expected to encour
age new cases.").
12 See Jordan Lite, State Admits Disabled Prisoners Were Discriminated Against, Vows
Changes, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 12, 1998, at A4.
13. See Split Down the Right, NATION, July 20, 1998, at 3.
14. 416 U.S. 396 {1974).
15. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 413 (emphasis added).
16. Sandra J. Carnahan, The Americans with Disabilities Act in State Correctional Insti
tutions, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 291, 315 (1999) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living

Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 {1985)). There are three traditional levels of judicial scrutiny
that are undertaken by courts. The most searching is "strict scrutiny," which can be satisfied
only if the classification in question is suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
See Carnahan, supra. This level of review is used to examine classifications based on "sus
pect status," such as race or religion. See id. The next level is "heightened scrutiny" of the
kind used in Procunier. The least stringent level of review is the use of a "rational basis"
test, under which classifications will be sustained if they are rationally related to a legitimate
state interest. See id. For more discussion of how these levels of review affect the correc
tional environment, see infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
17. 482 U.S. 78 {1987). At issue in the case was a challenge to two regulations in effect
at a Missouri correctional institution. The first, in most cases, only permitted correspon
dence between prisoners in different facilities if the "classification/treatment team" of each
inmate allowed it. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 81-82. The second permitted an inmate to marry
only with the pemtission of the superintendent of the prison, and provided that such ap
proval should be given only when there were compelling reasons to do so. See Turner, 482
U.S. at 82.
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rights were being infringed upon by a prison regulation. In that case,
the Court limited the Procunier holding to the narrow context of cor
respondence between prisoners and the general public.18 The Turner
majority concluded that subjecting all judgments of prison officials to
this type of heightened scrutiny would "seriously hamper their ability
to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to
the intractable problems of prison administration."19 The Court went
on to articulate four factors relevant in determining the "reasonable
ness" of the prison regulation at issue: (1) whether there is a valid, ra
tional connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate
governmental interest put forward to justify it, (2) whether there are
alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison
inmates, (3) the impact that accommodation of the asserted constitu
tional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the alloca
tion of prison resources generally, and (4) whether ready alternatives
to the regulation exist.20
Since the Turner decision, it has generally been clear that a prison
regulation that allegedly infringes upon an inmate's constitutional
rights is valid if it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological in
terest.21 The Turner Court specifically rejected the use of heightened
scrutiny in examining the efficacy of the prison regulation, instead re
quiring that a disputed regulation satisfy only the lowest level of scru
tiny that could be imposed by courts. 22
18.

See Turner, 482 U.S. at 88-91.

19. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. Instead, the Court highlighted that the difficult undertaking
of running a prison was a job best left to the executive and legislative branches, not the judi
ciary. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 85. The ramifications of the Turner Court's deference to the
legislature in this area will be discussed in Part II of this Note.
20. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90. The "ready alternatives" part of the test is not a "least
restrictive alternative" test: prison officials are not required to show why every possible
method of accommodating an inmate's claim under the test would not be possible. See
Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91. Moreover, it has been held that a trial court is not required to
weigh evenly or even consider explicitly each of the Turner factors - they are simply "rele
vant" to a court's determination. See Spies v. Voinovich, 173 F.3d 398, 403 (6th Cir. 1998).
For more on why these factors and others render the test extremely deferential to prison
administration decisions, see infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text
21. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89; see also O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350
(1987) (reaffirming the Turner standard with respect to the alleged infringement of inmates'
First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion). Perhaps the most oft-used example
of a legitimate penological interest is a prison security concern. For example, in the Turner
case itself, restrictions on inmate correspondence were promulgated due to the correctional
administration's belief that, by restricting these communications, prisons would combat the
growing problem of prison gang membership. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 91. The Supreme
Court found this prohibition "logically connected to these legitimate security concerns."
Turner, 482 U.S. at 91.
22 See supra note 16; see also Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 198-99 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
("But the similarity between Safley's phrasing and the language of rational basis review sug
gests to us that .. . Safley's standard is, if not identical, something very similar.").
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Turner, however, made no mention of the statutory rights of pris
oners, nor did it discuss whether cases implicating those rights would
also be subject to the deferential standard of review it outlined for
cases involving constitutional rights violations. This question has not
been resolved uniformly by the circuit courts. The Ninth Circuit, in a
case involving a statutory claim under the Rehabilitation Act, applied
the same standard of review defined in Turner for the review of consti
tutional rights in a prison setting.23 The Court believed that it was
"highly doubtful" that Congress intended a more stringent application
of the prisoners' statutory rights created by the Rehabilitation Act
than the Court would afford to their constitutional rights.24 The
Fourth Circuit has agreed, noting that due to the leeway that prison
officials are accorded where their actions threaten inmates' constitu
tional rights, "it follows a fortiori that prison officials enjoy similar
flexibility with respect to inmates' statutory rights."25
In contrast, some circuit courts have shied away from using the
Turner standard in all cases implicating inmates' statutory rights.26 For
example, the Eighth Circuit has held that some reviews of prison poli
cies may require more heightened judicial review than Turner allows.27
The court reasoned that other prisoners' rights cases, even some in
volving inmates' constitutional rights, did not preclude the use of
heightened scrutiny when warranted by the circumstances.28 The
Eleventh Circuit, in a case involving a prisoner's Rehabilitation Act

23. See Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994). Gates was apparently the
first case to use Turner's standard in the statutory rights context. See In Prison Context, the
ADA Must Be Interpreted Using the Turner Test, 6 CORRECTIONAL L. REP. 57 (1994)
("Prior to Gates, Turner was not used to interpret statutory rights.").
24. See Gates, 39 F.3d at 1447; see also Kaufman v. Carter, 952 F. Supp. 520, 532
Mich. 1996) (agreeing with the Gates reasoning).

(W.D.

25. Torcasio v. Murray, 57F.3d 1340, 1355 (4th Cir. 1995).
26. One circuit court has identified the question of whether principles of deference to
the decisions of prison officials in the context of constitutional law apply to statutory rights,
but has not decided it. In the case leading to the Supreme Court's Yeskey decision, the
Third Circuit "flagged" the question, but did not determine whether Turner applies to statu
tory rights generally or to ADA claims in particular. See Yeskey I, supra note 7, 118 F.3d
168, 174-75 (3d Cir. 1997) (taking note of the "controversial and difficult question whether
principles of deference to the decisions of prison officials in the context of constitutional law
apply to statutory rights" and noting that it was "not sure of the answer").
27.

See Pargo v. Elliott, 49F.3d 1355, 1357 (8th Cir. 1995).

28. See Pargo, 49 F.3d at 1357. The Eighth Circuit seemed to argue that if some in
fringements of prisoners' constitutional rights should receive heightened scrutiny, even post
Turner, then a violation of an inmate's statutory rights might also not always be limited to a
deferential standard of judicial review. This argument is addressed more fully in Part I. UI·
timately, the Pargo Court remanded the case to the trial court for more detailed factual
findings in order to determine the correct standard to be used. See Pargo, 49F.3d at 1357.
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claim, maintained that refusing to superimpose Turner's standard onto
the statute made "better sense" than applying it.29
The level of scrutiny appropriate for prisoners' statutory rights is
particularly complicated with regard to the ADA30 in light of Yeskey.
On the one hand, if inmates are subject to the use of Turner's "legiti
mate penological interest" test with regard to their constitutional
rights, perhaps their statutory rights should be no different. The Su
preme Court has often recognized the difficulties inherent in running a
prison and has clearly specified that courts are ill suited to become ar
biters of what constitutes the best solution to prison problems.31 Fur
thermore, in Turner the Court clearly stated that infringements on
prisoners' constitutional rights should be subject to loose judicial scru
tiny that gives great deference to the decisions of prison administra
tors.32
Yet other factors point toward the conclusion that the rights of
prisoners under the ADA should be protected to a greater degree
than that provided by the Turner test. First, the Supreme Court has
often held that prisoners do not lose protection from violations of
their rights simply because they are incarcerated.33 More specifically,

29. See Onishea v. Hopper, 126F.3d 1323, 1336 (11th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Onishea 1].
The Onishea Court argued instead that the inmate's claini should have been adjudicated
under the language of the Rehabilitation Act itself, see Onishea 1, supra, 126 F3d at 1336,
the merits of which are discussed in Section IV.A with respect to the ADA. Moreover, in
another context the Eleventh Circuit has continually refused to subject prisoners' statutory
clainls to the Turner test See Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F3d 502, 508-11 (11th Cir. 1996)
(holding that prisoners are covered by the ReligiousFreedom Restoration Act to the extent
intended by Congress). In further litigation in the Onishea matter, the Court went on to
explicitly state that Turner "does not, by its terms, apply to statutory rights." Onishea v.
Hopper, 171F.3d 1289, 1300 (11th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Onishea 11] (adding, however, that
consideration of the ideas behind the Turner factors in its Rehabilitation Act determinations
was not forbidden).
30. Only one circuit court has discussed the Turner standard as it applies to review of
statutory rights clainls under the ADA in particular. The Fourth Circuit, though it had ex
pressed agreement earlier with the idea that Turner should be applicable in statutory rights
clainls of prisoners, see supra note 25 and accompanying text, has not agreed with regard to
the ADA. See Amos v. Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety and Correctional Servs., 178 F.3d
212, 220-22 (4th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Amos 11] (arguing instead for deference to Depart
ment of Justice regulations and the "reasonable accommodation" language of the Act). Yet
both Gates and Onishea also involved a prisoner's claini under the Rehabilitation Act, a
piece of legislation that is very sinillar to the ADA in its protections for the disabled. See 42
U.S.C. § 12133 (1995). The specific reasoning used in these cases will be discussed later in
the Note.
31. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396, 404-05 (1974).
32

See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.

33. See, e.g., Turner, 482 U.S. at 84 ("Prison walls do not form a barrier separating
prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution."); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545
(1979); Procunier, 416 U.S. at 405 ("[A] policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any
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the Yeskey decision made clear that prisoners have the right to bring a
claim under the ADA.34 Furthermore, the ADA's mandate is a pow
erful one - to protect the disabled from discrimination based on their
physical or mental limitations and provide them \vith an equal playing
field in our society.35 These contrasting views leave the question:
When a principle of deference towards the decisions of prison admini
stration collides with rights provided to inmates by a statute such as
the ADA, how should courts strike a balance in adjudicating prison
ers' claims?
This Note will argue that when a prison regulation infringes upon
an inmate's statutory rights under the ADA, courts should not use the
deferential Turner standard of review. Such a standard would effec
tively render the ADA toothless in the correctional environment. In
stead, courts should incorporate the claims of the inmates and prison
administration into their "reasonable modification" determinations
under Title II of the ADA.36 Part I of this Note shows that the Turner
test has not been applied to all cases involving the alleged infringe
ment of prisoners' constitutional rights. Accordingly, it argues that
these cases demonstrate that when compelling reasons exist to deviate
from Turner, courts have and should continue to do so. Part II sug
gests that the characteristics of statutory rights in general, and those
granted by the ADA in particular, provide a number of persuasive
reasons to deviate from Turner. Part III contends that the use of the
Turner test in practice has effectively rendered the statutory protec
tions of ADA inapplicable in the prison context. Lastly, Part IV ar
gues that instead of applying Turner to inmates' claims under the
ADA, courts should consider the prison context as a part of their
ADA determinations. It also claims that doing so need not cause tre-

failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal or state
institution.").
34. See Yeskey II, supra note 8, 118 S. Ct 1952, 1954 (1998) (holding that the ADA's
language "unmistakably includes State prisons and prisoners within its coverage").
35. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.l(a) (1997); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(l), (3) (stating
that it is the intent of the Act "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities " and "to ensure that the
Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing [those] standards").
36. Title II of the ADA requires that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity." 42 U.S.C.§ 12132. The Act defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as
"an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modification to rules, poli
cies or practices ... meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or
the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2)
(emphasis added). This Note focuses on Title II of the ADA because it plays the most
prominent role in prisoner litigation under the Act, while Titles I, III, IV, and V have only
limited application for prison inmates. For an excellent summary of the potential scope of
the ADA regarding prisoner claims, see Robbins, supra note 6, at 76-81.
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mendous financial or administrative burdens for correctional facilities.
This Note concludes that administering the ADA in this way would
provide disabled prisoners with a more evenhanded adjudication of
their discrimination claims, while also respecting the legitimate con
cerns of prison administration.
I.

THE TURNER STANDARD'S APPLICABILITY TO CASES
!NVOLVING PRISONERS' RIGHTS

Although the Supreme Court has said that Turner should apply to
"all circumstances in which the needs of prison administration impli
cate constitutional rights,"37 some courts and commentators have
claimed that Turner was never meant to apply in all cases involving
the alleged infringement of prisoners' rights, nor to all constitutional
rights cases. This Part examines case law after Turner and demon
strates that a number of courts reviewing prison policies or practices
do not require a Turner-like standard of judicial deference. This real
ity weakens the argument, proffered by two circuit courts, that the
Turner standard should be used in cases involving statutory rights
simply because it is used in the constitutional rights setting.38 This Part
will show that this does not always occur - in at least four types of
cases, courts have refused to apply Turner to prison disputes regarding
alleged constitutional rights violations.39 Consequently, courts should
look more closely at why they would use the Turner standard in future
litigation, rather than simply assuming that it should automatically ap
ply in all prison cases.
First, a number of courts have held that when the challenged rule
does not implicate concerns involving prison security or institutional
order, a more strict standard than Turner should apply. For example,
in Pitts v. Thornburgh,40 the District of Columbia Circuit held that the

37. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990).
38. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
39. There is at least one other instance, regarding the review of prisoners' Fourth
Amendment claims, where, while some courts have not questioned the use of the Turner
"reasonableness" standard in general, they have declined to apply the four factors laid out
by the Turner court to define that standard. See Foote v. Spiegel, 995 F. Supp. 1347, 1349
(D.Utah 1998) (employing the Turner standard of review, but using factors enumerated in
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), to address inmate Fourth Amendment claims); see also
Hayes v. Marriott, 70 F.3d 1144, 1146-47 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying Bell and Turner factors
jointly); Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1535 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J., concurring)
(finding that Turner "distills the principles originally established in Bell"); Michenfelder v.
Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 331 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988) (remarking that the second Turner factor is
"much more meaningful in the First Amendment context than the Fourth, where the right is
to be free from a particular wrong").
40. 866F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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Turner standard of scrutiny was inapplicable to the equal protection
review of a District of Columbia policy which mandated that female
inmates be housed in a remote facility in West Virginia while male
inmates were placed in institutions far closer to the District.41 Pitts ap
plied a heightened level of scrutiny, arguing that Turner applies most
directly to cases involving "the daily oversight of inmate behavior,
with the attendant security concerns and necessary limitations upon
'prisoners rights.' "42 The court suggested that in a case implicating
only "general budgetary and policy choices," the Turner standard was
not appropriate.43 Other courts have also made this distinction with
regard to cases not implicating concerns of prison order or security.44
Second, many courts have refused to apply the Turner standard to
prisoners' claims emanating from discrimination based on a "suspect
classification." The Supreme Court has ruled that when a state classi
fies by race, alienage, or national origin, these factors are seldom rele
vant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest and may often
reflect prejudice and antipathy. As a result, laws containing these
classifications are subjected to "strict scrutiny" and will be sustained
only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.45

41. See Pitts, 866 F.2d at 1453. Incarceration in institutions located in Alderson, West
Virginia, resulted in a number of hardships for the woman prisoners: they received fewer
visitors (especially family members) as well as less preparation for and support in their even
tual return to the District than male prison inmates did. See Pitts, 866 F.2d at 1452.
42. Pitts, 866F.2d at 1454.
43. Pitts, 866 F.2d at 1454. The court's decision was also motivated in part by the fact
that the regulation implicated gender discrimination concerns, an area that the Supreme
Court has held calls for heightened scrutiny. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
44. See Schultz v. Lewis, No. 92-15782, 1993 WL 230191, at *l (9th Cir. June 28, 1993)
(holding that Turner should not apply because the case may address "purely administrative
concerns rather than valid pehological objectives"); Lyon v. Del Vande Krol, 940 F. Supp.
1433, 1438 (S.D. Iowa 1996) (applying the "usual strict scrutiny rule for fundamental rights"
in place of Turner in case involving challenge to litigation and court administration process
"[b]ecause this case raises none of the concerns ... about second-guessing prison officials
judgments concerning prison administration and security").

In a dissenting opinion in Griffin v. Wisconsin, Justice Blackmun also suggested that
Turner should not apply to probation regulations because those restrictions on inmates were

not motivated by the " 'essential goals' of 'maintaining institutional security and preserving
internal order and discipline' inside the walls of a prison." Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.
868, 883 n2 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546
(1979)). The majority in the case did not reach the issue, see 483 U.S. at 874 n.2, but com
mentators have noted the dissent's skepticism in indicating that the Turner test would likely
not apply. See Daniel E. Post, Co=ent, The Constitutionality ofParole Departments Dis
closing the HIV Status ofParolees, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1993, 2012 ("The dissent in Griffin in
timates that a probationer's freedom imposes different goals on probation authorities that
do necessitate the adoption of the deferential Turner test").
45. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-76 (1971) (concerning application of
state welfare laws discriminating against aliens); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192
(1964) (involving Florida statute providing for punishment of mixed race couples who were
unmarried and lived in same household).
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Other classifications, sometimes referred to as "quasi-suspect," also
call for a heightened standard of review, though not as stringent as the
aforementioned groups. These include classifying by gender, which
must be substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental
interest,46 and illegitimacy, which must be substantially related to a le
gitimate state interest.47 Courts have agreed that inmates' claims of
discrimination rising as a result of their status as a member of a "sus
pect class" should receive this type of heightened review, specifically
in cases involving gender discrimination48 or racial discrimination.49
Presumably other suspect classifications, such as discrimination based
on alienage and national origin, would also receive more rigorous re
view in the prison context under this line of argument.50
Third, courts and commentators have recognized that some per
sons who are associated with the penal system, but have a greater ex
pectation of liberty due to their unique circumstances, should also re
ceive a heightened level of review for their constitutional rights claims.
This argument has arisen regarding the claims of probationers and pa
rolees,51 the actions of duly admitted attorneys within prison con-

46. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-26 (1981) (challenging
denial of university admission to male desiring nursing education because of sex); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (challenging Oklahoma statutes providing for differing age re
strictions for men and women seeking to purchase alcohol).
47. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 98-99 (1982) (challenging Texas statute provid
ing for limitations on illegitimate children in seeking child support that were not present for
legitimate children). Though the test for classifications based on illegitimacy is slightly dif
ferent than that for classifications based on gender, the Supreme Court has ruled that ille
gitimacy also holds quasi-suspect status. Such classifications are subject to "more" than ra
tional basis review - what the Court has termed "a realm of less than strictest scrutiny."
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977).
48. See, e.g., Pargo v. Elliott, 49 F3d 1355 (8th Cir. 1995) (unsure whether Turner should
automatically apply to case questioning whether male and female inmates could by deemed
similarly situated for purposes of equal protection analysis); Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220,
1230 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying interm�diate scrutiny to challenge by class of women prison
ers and concluding that "penological necessity is not a defense to Title IX" (emphasis in
original)); Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F2d 1450, 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (expressing skepticism
toward Turner standard in the context of a gender discrimination claim); West v. Virginia
Dep't of Corrections, 847 F. Supp. 402, 406 (W.D. Va. 1994) (applying "intermediate scru
tiny" in case where distinction drawn between male and female inmates for purposes of ad
mission into boot camp program); Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1979);
see also Robbins, supra note 6, at 112 n.231 (listing these results). But see Klinger v. De
partment of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 733 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding the Turner standard of
deference appropriate in case brought by a class of women prisoners asserting equal protec
tion violations).
49.

See Robbins, supra note 6, at 66 & nn.80-81.

50.

See West, 847 F. Supp. at 406 (operating under this assumption).

51. See Griffin v. WISconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 883 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Deborah
Dalrymple-Blackbum, Comment, AIDS, Prisoners, and theAmericans With Disabilities Act,
1995 UTAH L. REV. 839, 867; Post, supra note 44, at 2012.
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fines,52 and with respect to management of conditions in county or
municipal jails designed primarily to house individuals charged with
but not convicted of criminal offenses.53
Fourth, courts have indicated that the Turner standard should not
apply to Eighth Amendment claims because rights under that
Amendment apply only to inmates, and therefore courts would have
no justification for lessening its protection in prison facilities. For ex
ample, the Ninth Circuit argued that "Turner has been applied only
where the constitutional right is one enjoyed by all persons, but the
exercise of which may necessarily be limited due to the unique circum
stances of imprisonment."54 In contrast, the court held that Eighth
Amendment rights do not conflict with incarceration but simply limit
the hardships that can be inflicted upon the incarcerated as "punish
ment."55 Perhaps for these reasons, the Supreme Court has never ap
plied Turner to an Eighth Amendment case.56
These cases demonstrate that with regard to the constitutional
rights of prisoners, despite the language used in Turner and its prog
eny, there is a fairly broad consensus that the Turner test should not
apply in all constitutional rights cases. While some, but certainly not
all, cases of infringements on prisoners' statutory rights under the
ADA would meet one of these exceptions,57 these cases are significant

52

See Sturm v. Oark, 835 F.2d 1009, 1014 {3d Cir. 1987).

53.

See Fennell v. Simmons, 951 F. Supp. 706, 713 (N.D. Ohio 1997).

54. Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1530 {9th Cir. 1993) (en bane).
55. See Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1530 {"Whatever rights one may lose at the prison gates • • •
the full protections of the eighth amendment most certainly remain in force." (citing Spain v.
Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193-94 {9th Cir. 1979))); see also Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269,
272 {7th Cir. 1983) (not applying Turner with regard to Eighth Amendment claim); Curry v.
Hall, 839 F. Supp. 1437, 1440 {D. Or. 1993) {"With certain exceptions, notably the Eighth
Amendment, the Turner framework applies in approaching all claims in which it is asserted
that a particular prison practice or rule implicates constitutional rights.").
56. See Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1530 (implying that because the Supreme Court had never
applied Turner in this way, the Court would agree with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion).
57. Even if each noted exception were accepted by the Supreme Court, a large number
of prisoner ADA cases would still implicate Turner. For example, it can first be acknowl
edged that while some prisoner ADA claims have no bearing on matters of inmate behavior
or institutional order and security, in many cases the prison regulations which lead to in
mates' ADA claims are promulgated because of such concerns, and would therefore not be
subject to this exemption.
Second, the Supreme Court has ruled that the disabled are not a "suspect class" and that
claims of discrimination based on disability should not automatically receive strict scrutiny.
See City of Oeburne v. Oeburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 {1985). City of Cleburne
would make it much more difficult to equate prisoners' ADA claims with the female prison
ers' equal protection claims in a case like Pitts. Yet in some prisoner ADA litigation, judges
have noted the similarity between discriminating against an inmate based on race, a "suspect
class," and discriminating against an inmate because of his or her disability. See Crawford v.
Indiana Dep't of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481, 486 {7th Cir. 1997) {"If a prison may not exclude
blacks from the prison dining hall and force them to eat in their cells, and if Congress thinks
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in another way. They show that the Turner standard, even in the
realm of prisoners' constitutional rights, should not be used in the re
view of every case. Instead, they indicate that if there are compelling
reasons why a more rigorous analysis is necessitated in adjudicating
these claims,58 the use of the Turner test may be inappropriate. As
noted earlier, the circuit courts that have indicated that a different
standard of review might apply to inmates' claims involving statutory
rights have used this exact rationale.59

II. THE NATURE OF STATUTORY RIGHTS AND THE
MANDATEOFTHEADA
In Gates v. Rowland, the Ninth Circuit saw no reason to differenti
ate between the constitutional and statutory rights of prisoners, and
held that if the Turner test applied in the constitutional rights setting,
it should also apply to an inmate's statutory rights.60 Yet a number of
factors involving the nature of statutory rights in general and the
ADA in particular persuasively argue for a different conclusion that the impact of the ADA should not be significantly diluted in pris
ons by granting extreme deference to the decisions of prison adminis
trators. This Part argues that courts must distinguish between consti-

that discriminating against a blind person is like discriminating against a black person, it is
not obvious that the prison may exclude the blind person from the dining hall ...");Torry,
supra note 1, (reporting that in oral argument in the Yeskey case, Justice O'Connor was
skeptical of the argument that the state can deny inmates certain rights and asked the defen
dant's attorney: "Do you think that this court would sanction a policy that black prisoners
have to eat in separate dining rooms?").
Third, there is little doubt that almost all prison ADA claims are brought by inmates
themselves, and not those groups of people associated with the prison environment but who
nonetheless have a greater expectation of liberty. See supra notes 51-5 3 and accompanying
text. And lastly, the provisions of the ADA are not rights that can only be claimed by pris
oners, unlike Eighth Amendment claims. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
58. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Gates seemed not to recognize any reason, short of a
Congressional mandate to the contrary, why review of prisoner claims made pursuant to
statutory rights should differ from the standard applicable to constitutional rights. See Gates
v.Rowland, 39 F.3d 14 39, 1447 (1994) ("It is highly doubtful that Congress intended a more
stringent application of the prisoners' statutory rights created by the Act than it would the
prisoners' constitutional rights. Thus, we deem the applicable standard ...to be equivalent
to the review ... in Turner v. Safley."). In contrast, this Note provides many reasons why
statutory rights in general and the ADA in particular provide a compelling rationale to
abandon Turner in ADA cases and defer to the "reasonable modification" language of the
Act's Title II in addressing claims. See infra Parts II & III.
59. See, e.g., Onishea I, supra note 29, 126 F.3d 1 32 3 (11th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging
that a more rigorous standard might be appropriate in a statutory rights case arising under
the Rehabilitation Act); Pargo v.Elliott, 49 F.3d 1 355 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that the excep
tions to Turner in the constitutional rights context argues for a potentially stronger standard
in other cases).
60. See Gates, 39 F.3d at 1447.
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tutional rights•and such statutory rights as those provided in the ADA
in order to (1) conform to the intent of the Turner decision regarding
the enhanced fact finding ability of the legislature and the centralized
nature of its determinations, (2) acknowledge the flexibility of statu
tory decision making as opposed to the creation of constitutional
rights, and (3) rely on the specificity of statutes such as the ADA to
address some problems of interpretation.
First, the rationales behind the Turner decision support a distinc
tion between constitutional rights and rights provided by a legislative
enactment such as the ADA. One important reason for the Turner
policy of judicial deference was that courts are not well equipped to
make decisions relating to the urgent problems of prison administra
tion and reform.61 The Court specifically noted that:
Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires
expertise, planning and the commitment of resources, all of which are pe

culiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of
government. Prison administration is, moreover, a task that has been
committed to the responsibility of those branches, and separation of pow
ers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint.62

In passing the ADA, which creates a new set of statutory rights,
the legislature has made exactly the type of reasoned determination
that the Turner Court argued it was uniquely qualified to make.63
Through the ADA, Congress determined that "no qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity."64 Moreover, the Supreme Court has unambiguously

61.

See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 {1987).

62

Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-85 (emphasis added) (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.

396, 405 {1974)). The Supreme Court has also generally agreed that with regard to laws af
fecting the disabled in particular, deference to Congress's investigative power is important.
See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-43 {"How this large and diversified group is to be
treated under the law is a difficult and often a technical matter, very much a task for legisla
tors guided by qualified professionals and not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions of the
judiciary."). Unlike courts, Congress has the ability to hold hearings regarding particular
legislation, receive large amounts of witness testimony on the potential effects of a particular
Act and spend long periods of time crafting that legislation - luxuries that are not generally
available to the judicial branch.
63. See also Onishea I, supra note 29, 126 F.3d at 1336 (recognizing that "although
Turner serves to restrain the judiciary from interfering in prison matters, a job best left to
the legislative and administrative branches, rights under the Rehabilitation Act emanate
from those branches" (citations omitted)). Moreover, while Turner can be said to serve fed
eralism concerns by keeping federal authority out of state prisons, unless it is clear that Con
gress intended such an intrusion, see Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1345 {4th Cir. 1995),
this does not justify application of the Turner standard in the ADA context as Yeskey has
already determined that the ADA does apply to state prisons.

64. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 12132 {1994).
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stated that the effect of the statutory language of Congress was to in
clude prisoners within the umbrella of the AD A's protection.65
While it is unclear whether the ADA's drafters intended for the
Act to apply specifically to prisoners,66 the Turner Court's rationale for
deference to the legislature is still persuasive in this case. In Yeskey,
the Supreme Court stated that even if Congress had not considered
prisoners when writing the ADA, that did not mean that the statute
should have any less effect with regard to inmates.67 Instead, the
Court held that this did not demonstrate congressional ambiguity with
respect to prisoners, but rather was an example of the "breadth" of the
ADA.68 The Fourth Circuit has recently agreed that deference should
be given to Congress's findings of discrimination as stated in the
ADA, even in the context of prisoners' claims, stating that "[i]t would
be obtuse for us to believe that the discrimination Congress found to
be so pervasive in the free world automatically stops at the prison
gates."69 In line with this reasoning, the Turner Court's rationale for
deferring to the legislative branch regarding prison matters should not
be read to cover only those situations where Congress produces a bill

65. See Yeskey II, supra note 8, 118 S. Cl 1952, 1954 (1998) (holding that "state prisons
fall squarely within the statutory definition of 'public entity' ").
66. It is not clear what Congress's intent was with regard to the level of scrutiny that
prisoners' ADA claims should receive. Some have argued that Congress, in writing the
ADA, specifically intended that the courts should consider disabled persons a suspect class
and apply strict scrutiny to their claims. See Robbins, supra note 6, at 93; see also James B.
Miller, The Disabled, the ADA and Strict Scrutiny, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 393 (1994). The
Supreme Court itself noted in Yeskey that the ADA's reference in its statement of findings
and purpose to discrimination " 'in such critical areas as . . .institutionalization,' §
12101(a)(3), can be thought to include penal institutions." Yeskey II, supra note 8, 118 S. Ct.
at 1955 (1998). Yet the Court ultimately assumed without deciding that the legislature did
not specifically consider prisoners when constructing the Act. See Yeskey II, supra note 8,
118 S. Ct. at 1955.
Additionally, there is some evidence that at least one architect of the ADA agrees with
the Yeskey decision that prisoners should be able to bring ADA claims, and that in general,
their claims should receive the same protection as the claims of citizen5 who are not incar
cerated. See Harkin, an Architect ofAct, Says He's Not Upset, DES MOINES REG., June 16,
1998, at 3 [hereafter Harkin] (reporting that Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa, one of the archi
tects of the Americans with Disabilities Act, said he was not troubled by the [Supreme
Court's Yeskey] ruling and that" '[p]eople with disabilities who commit crimes should serve
their time just as people without disabilities.' "). Yet the text of the Act itself offers no such
indication, and the legislative history of the ADA is absent of any significant reference to
prisoners or the correctional environment.
67.

See Yeskey II, supra note 8, 118 S. Ct. at 1955-56.

68.

See Yeskey II, supra note 8, 118 S. Ct. at 1956.

69. Amos II, supra note 30, 178 F.3d at 219 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that while its"defer
ence to Congress must not be blind ... a great deal of deference must still be given to Con
gress, especially in the face of a fully developed evidentiary record of discrimination"). The
court also recognized that Congress did gather evidence in the past on arbitrary discrimina
tion against the disabled in prisons. See Amos II, supra note 30, 178 F.3d at 219 n5.
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intended specifically to apply to correctional facilities. Congress's su
perior factfinding ability is no less relevant and still far superior to that
of the courts when it is used to devise statutes with broad mandates.
Moreover, the centralized nature of Congress's decision making
regarding the ADA would also quell the Turner Court's fear that nu
merous courts around the country would provide differing and con
fusing mandates for prisons to follow. The Turner majority expressed
this view by worrying that such rulings would "distort the decision
making process" and subject every administrative judgment to the
"possibility that some court somewhere would conclude that it had a
less restrictive way of solving the problem at hand."70 Unlike a case
implicating a constitutional right, a statutory rights case does not re
quire the court itself to establish a set of guidelines that could have the
effect of restricting a prison warden's flexibility. In passing a statute
such as the ADA, Congress has provided a centralized set of standards
that courts and prison administrators can turn to when disputes arise.71
The application of a statute like the ADA to state prison facilities ad
dresses the Turner majority's worry that numerous and potentially
conflicting requirements should not be placed on correctional facili
ties.72
Therefore, in situations involving the infringement of a prisoner's
statutory rights, some of the most important reasons for adopting the
Turner test are not applicable. Unlike courts, Congress is at least as
able as prison administrators to articulate workable solutions to prison
problems - a reality that should force a more detailed examination as
to whether Turner should generally apply in a statutory context.73
Second, the nature of constitutional rights as compared to that of
statutory rights supports a preference for granting the latter greater
application in the prison context. This premise might initially seem
counterintuitive, as Americans are conditioned to view constitutional
70.

Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 89 (1987).

71.

The idea of creating a comprehensive set of standards for this purpose was a moti
vating factor for Congress in passing the Act. See Carnahan, supra note 16, at 297.
72. Moreover, deference to the legislature in some statutory rights cases has the added
benefit of allowing courts to avoid the appearance of judicial lawmaking. See Raines v.
Florida, 987 F. Supp. 1416, 1420 (N.D. Fla. 1997).
73. The Turner Court did not indicate that Congress was more able than prison adminis
trators to articulate workable solutions to prison problems - in fact it indicated that both
were able to do so. See Turner, 482 U. S. at 84-85 (noting that the problems of prisons are
"peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches" as well as that
"[w]here a state penal system is involved . . . [there is] additional reason to afford deference
to the appropriate prison authorities"). This argument merely identifies why Congress's in
volvement makes statutes different from constitutional cases with respect to Turner's appli
cation in prisons. The other arguments regarding the statute itself articulated in this Part,
the arguments relating to the ADA's application in prisons in Part III, and the flexibility of
the statute's "reasonable modification" language, noted in Part IV, all demonstrate more
particularly why Turner should not be used in the ADA context.
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rights as the most "special" rights with which they are endowed, due to
the respect that we afford to the Constitution's guarantee of liberties.
Yet statutory rights have the advantage of providing guidance for
prison administrators while also allowing for flexibility if a bill's provi
sions become unworkable in the correctional environment. If a stat
ute's guidelines are found to be unworkable in prisons, the legislative
body can amend them to remedy those deficiencies and still retain the
option to make further changes in the future. In contrast, once courts
make constitutional rights determinations, those rulings cannot be
overturned by the legislature.74 Moreover, these constitutional grants
of liberty are also difficult to overrule within the courtroom, as courts
prefer a stable body of law to one that constantly changes depending
on the identity of judges on the bench.75 As a result of the greater
flexibility they provide to the legislature to address weaknesses in the
correctional environment, statutory rights should be granted greater
application than are constitutional rights for inmates.
Third, legislation such as the ADA provides courts and prison ad
ministrators with far greater detail than do grants of constitutional
rights. While rules of constitutional law are unique in that they de
pend entirely upon judicial decisions to determine their scope,76 legis
lative determinations often have the ability to provide greater speci
ficity in their text and are augmented by agency interpretations. Thus,
the legislature is able to provide prison administrators with substantial
guidance in attempting to ensure that their prison's regulations will
meet legal standards regarding disabled prisoners.77 As with many
other statutes, the ADA's provisions are supplemented by guidelines
provided by governmental agencies, including the Department of Jus
tice.78 In particular, it has been stated that "the text of the ADA was

74. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that Congress ex
ceeded its authority under the Enforcement Oause of the Fourteenth Amendment in en
acting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). It has been recognized that Boerne ex
plained that "[o]nee the Court clearly pronounced the appropriate level of scrutiny for equal
protection analysis, Congress lost the power to raise the standard." Carnahan, supra note
16, at 316.
75. The Supreme Court stated in Boerne that when Congress acts "against the back
ground of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood
that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due
them under settled principles, including stare decisis." Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536; see also Car
nahan, supra note 16, at 316.
76. See Raines, 987 F. Supp. at 1420.
77. The relative inability of courts to provide more than minimal instruction to correc
tional facilities seemed to be exactly the concern of the Court in Turner when it worried that
courts "would become the primary arbiters of what constitutes the best solution to every
[prison] administrative problem." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
78. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for
Buildings and Facilities; State and Local Government Facilities, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,676 (1994)
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laden with detail" and that the standards for compliance are detailed
"in literally hundreds of pages of specifications."79 The existence of
ADA-related agency regulations, combined with the detail of the leg
islation itself, provide exactly the type of specificity that the Turner
Court generally supposed the legislative branches would supply. This
provides further justification for the proposition that instead of relying
on the Turner standard, a "judicially created test for judicially con
strued rights," courts would better serve the policy of deference un
derlying Turner by looking to these regulations and the text of the
statute when possible if ambiguity exists.80
The nature of statutory rights in general, and of the ADA in par
ticular, reveals some important reasons why courts should not simply
defer to the decisions of prison administrators when inmates bring
claims under the Act. These reasons demonstrate that arguments for
the use of the Turner test in the constitutional rights setting, a realm of
cases where the standard is not even incorporated in all instances, are
even less persuasive when applied to grants of statutory rights to in
mates.

III.

THE TURNER STANDARD'S EFFECT ON TIIB ADA'S
APPLICATION IN PRIS ONS

From its inception, the Turner standard has been viewed by courts
and commentators as being highly deferential to prison administration
decisions, with the potential to severely limit the legal rights of prison
ers.81 In his dissenting opinion in Turner, Justice Stevens warned that

(establishing accessibility standards for new construction and alteration of facilities covered
by Title II of tlte ADA); Americans witlt Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines for
Buildings and Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,408 {1991). In the ADA itself, Congress directed
tlte Justice Department to issue implementing regulations and render technical assistance
explaining tlte responsibilities of covered individuals and institutions. See 42 U.S.C. §§
12186{b), 12206(c) {1994).
79. Robbins, supra note 6, at 81, 91.
80. See Emily Alexander, Note, The Americans With Disabilities Act and State Prisons:
A Question of Statutory Interpretation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2233, 2276 {1998); see also
Amos II, supra note 30, 178 F.3d at 221. The existence of tlte Act itself and tlte agency pro
visions provide significant assistance for courts tltat is often not available in cases involving a
constitutional rights dispute. Of course, reliance on tlte text of such a statute as tlte ADA
and agency provisions will have its limits, as tltere will always be ambiguities tltat a court
must resolve. See infra Section IV.A.
81. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 100 {Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that if tlte standard "can
be satisfied by notlting more titan a 'logical connection' between tlte regulation and any le
gitimate penological concern perceived by a cautious warden, it is virtually meaningless").
Courts examining tlte "legitimate penological interest" standard in recent years have contin
ued to note tltat it is a "highly deferential standard." Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1356
(4tlt Cir. 1995). This should not be surprising. Since one of tlte fundamental concerns of
prison administration is to maintain tlte security and order of its prisons, almost any regula-
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"[a]pplication of the standard would seem to permit disregard for in
mates' constitutional rights whenever the imagination of the warden
produces a plausible security concem."82 In particular,, if this standard
is applied to the review of potential ADA violations by prisons, "only
the truly horrifying scenario of inmate abuse will have. a prospect for
relief' under the Act.83 The Turner standard is so difficult to over
come for prisoners bringing ADA claims because it: (1) allows secu
rity concerns to gain an overwhelming importance not intended by the
ADA, and (2) shifts the burden of justifying the restriction from the
institution to the inmate, who must show that it is an overreaction.84
Additionally, courts have maintained that if the standard of review
of the disabled prisoners' statutory claims is equivalent to the standard
for constitutional claims, then it is obvious that the statute's protec
tions make little difference in the prison context.85 Prior to the Yeskey
decision, one court had even argued that the results of applying the
Turner standard to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act inthe prison con
text would mean that such claims would rarely succeed, and that this
result was evidence that the statutes were not intended to apply to
prisons at all.86 Of course, the Yeskey decision has since made it clear
that these statutes do apply to state prisons. If the use of the Turner
test would frustrate this ruling by making the ADA's application to
prisons "unworkable," that result is evidence that such a standard
should not be used.
Section III.A examines the practical effect of the use of the Turner
standard in cases involving claims by disabled prisoners. It will do so
by analyzing cases decided under the authority of the Ninth Circuit,
which is one of only two circuits to have decided that the Turner stan-

tion intended to make the daily routine of prison life
by some type of security rationale.
82.

run

more smoothly might be justified

Turner, 482 U.S. at 100-01.

83. Robbins, supra note 6, at 110; see also William C. Collins,

Use ofTurner Test Defer
ring to Institutions' Security Concerns May Sharply Limit Inmates' ADA Protection, 6
CORRECTIONAL L. REP. 65, 65(1995) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit's decision in Gates v.
Rowland, applying the Turner test to prisoners' claims under the Rehabilitation Act, "may
gut portions of the Americans With Disabilities Act . . . as it applies to inmates"). It has
also been argued that the requirements of the ADA are inconsistent with the general princi
ple that deference is due to prison officials. See Carnahan, supra note 16, at 315.
84. See Collins, supra note 83, at 74. Furthermore, in placing an increased burden on
the inmate to combat the claims of prison administrators, courts would be requiring justifica
tion from a party whose ability to provide information regarding prison safety conditions or
institutional alternatives is drastically inferior.
85.

See Callaway v. Smith County, 991 F. Supp. 801, 806 (E.D. Tex. 1998).

86. See Amos v. Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety & Correctional Servs., 126 F.3d 589, 607
(4th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Amos .I].
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dard should apply to review of disabled prisoners' statutory claims.87
Ultimately, it will argue that this approach precluded prisoners from
prevailing in their claims under the Rehabilitation Act,88 even when
the justifications produced by prison administration were based on
very weak evidence. Next, Section III.B will claim that the use of the
Turner test effectively eliminates any consideration of the prisoner's
disability or personal physical discomfort, focusing instead solely on
the legitimacy of the prison rule involved. Only when a rule is deemed
not to have a "legitimate penological interest" might any considera
tion then be given to the inmate's disability. This procedural result
has the effect of eliminating any consideration of the ADA's provi
sions in a large number of inmate ADA cases - a result that is incon
sistent with the Supreme Court's mandate in Yeskey that the Act
should apply inside prison walls.

A

The Damaging Results of the Ninth Circuit's Gates Decision

After the Ninth Circuit ruled that prisoners' claims under the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act would be reviewed using the Turner
standard, the circuit has consistently upheld the denial of those
claims.89 The use of the deferential "legitimate penological interest"
test has allowed weak rationales to prevail over prisoners' statutory
rights, and provides a disturbing preview of the outcome of a potential
Supreme Court decision that would validate the Turner standard for
use in this context. One such rationale often employed in these cases
argues that it is not the reality of the disability, but how that disability
is perceived that should take precedence in Turner-based determina
tions of claims by the disabled.90 This consequence is particularly un
fortunate in light of the fact that Congress passed the ADA in part to
change stereotypical assumptions made about the disabled that had no
basis in fact.91 These cases also allow two other dangerous arguments
to prevail under the Turner test: that prisoners are ignorant and ab
normal,92 and that solutions should be implemented that punish the
disabled inmate instead of protecting his rights.93

87. See Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1447 {9th Cir. 1994).
88. The remedies, procedures, and rights under Title II of the ADA are the same as under the Rehabilitation Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 {1994).
89. See infra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 1210l{a)(7) ("[I]ndividuals with disabilities . . . have been faced with
restrictions and limitations . . . resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of
the individual ability of such individuals to participate in
society.").
. • .

92 See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.

93. See infra notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
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In Gates, for example, the defendants were excluded from serving
food at their correctional facility because they were HIV-positive,94
despite the fact that the risks of a "prisoner acquiring HIV through
food service are slight," amounting only to "theoretic possibilities."95
The court agreed with the argument that if HIV-positive prisoners
were placed in these jobs, other prisoners would fear that they would
bleed or spit into the food - and that such fears would lead to vio
lence.96 The prison's argument that many inmates "are not necessarily
motivated by rational thought" and frequently have irrational phobias
"that education will not modify" succeeded in satisfying the Turner
test.97
Similarly, in Bullock v. Gomez,98 a prisoner with HIV was denied
an overnight visit with his wife. The prison administration claimed
this was because "theoretical[ly]" such visits could cause fear in other
prisoners that they "'might be exposed to the disease by the subse
quent family visitors," and that these concerns, even if they had no va
lidity, could result in violence because inmates have "different ways of
dealing with their concerns than regular people. "99 The prison made
this argument although the warden admitted that this was "not a sig
nificant security issue"100 and that no prisoners had ever previously
objected to such visitors.101 The court, though refusing to grant sum-

94. The court held that the Rehabilitation Act's protection of disabled individuals in
cluded those infected with the HIV virus. See Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir.
1994). The Supreme Court later agreed that HIV infection is a disability under the ADA,
even when the infection has not progressed to the "so-called symptomatic phase." See
Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. a. 2196, 2200, 2204 (1998).

See Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d. 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994).

95.

96. See id. The court also recognized that its decision was motivated by the "perception
problems" in the methods of transmission of the virus and that the defendants were not at
tempting to justify the policy on medical considerations of the likelihood of transmitting the
virus through food service. See id. Thus, the plaintiff was denied a job open to other in
mates not because of a risk associated with his disability, but because of other inmates' ill
formed perceptions of his disability.
97. Id. at 1448. It seems clear that the defendant's argunient was based on the premise
that prisoners are not amenable to such education based on their general nature. See Julie
Brienza, Appellate Panel Ruling Boots Prisoners with HIV out of the Kitchen, TRIAL, Feb.
1995, at 93 (quoting Michael Santoki, Supervising Deputy Attorney General of California,
after the Gates decision as saying that the appeals panel found that "you can't educate peo
ple's fears away when they're stuck in prison. These are not socially well-adjusted people.").
98. 929 F. Supp. 1299 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
99.

Id. at 1306-07 (emphasis added).

100.

Id at 1307.

101. See id. at 1306-07 (warden testifying that he was unaware of any instance where
prisoners were unwilling to use a family visiting trailer after a prisoner known to have HIV
used it, or where a prisoner had objected to assignment to a cell formerly occupied by an
HIV-positive inmate).
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mary judgment to the defendant, held that these theoretical claims
need not to be shown to have caused past violence to be successful
under Turner.
In Fowler v. Gomez,102 the plaintiff was on crutches103 and was not
allowed to be fed outside the infirmary unless he carried his own food
tray. Prison officials had thrown away plaintiff's food when he had not
followed this regulation, forcing him to forage food from the trash can
to feed himself.104 In finding for the prison administration, the court
held with little comment that the regulation satisfied Turner because
its purpose was to "permit medical observation and provide for plain
tiff's needs without detracting from custody operations in other ar
eas."105
Additionally, in Martinez v. California Department of Correc
tions, 106 a prison regulation that restricted a quadriplegic to the hospi
tal unit of the prison, thereby denying him access to the general yard,
classroom education, and vocational training programs, was found to
pass the Turner test.107 The court accepted the justification that the
plaintiff would be unable to defend himself from attacks by other in
mates in these venues and therefore should be confined to the hospi
tal.108 In contrast, the dissent argued that the regulation should not
pass the Turner test because the security concerns presented by the
plaintiff's presence would be the result of potential misconduct by
other inmates.109
102. No. C 94-2679 FMS, 1995 WL 779128, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 1995).
103. The court assumed without deciding that the plaintiff had a disability for the pur
poses of this argument, although it noted that it was not convinced that the temporary use of
crutches qualifies a person as disabled under the ADA. See Fowler, 1995 WL 779128, at *3

n.1.

104. See id. at *1.
105. Id. at *1-2.
106. 112 F .3d 516, 1997 WL 207946, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 25, 1997) (unpublished opinion).
107. See id. at *1.
108. See id. at *l.
109. See id. at *2 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) ("I do not think it is rational to prevent tnis
conduct by punishing the potential victim rather than those who tnisbehave."). The dissent
also believed that the prison provided no justification for its other security claim, that
Martinez's medical condition requires him to be closely monitored by hospital staff in the
infirmary. See id. at *2 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (finding that "nothing about Martinez's daily
condition" requires this). Prison officials tnight claim that in light of the Supreme Court's
affirmation, in Farmer v. Brennan, of the principle that prisons have a duty to protect pris
oners from violence at the hands of other prisoners, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994), these restric
tions are necessary to accomplish that goal. Yet the same goal tnight often be accomplished
just as effectively by affirmatively providing protection for the prisoner, instead of restricting
his opportunities within the prison. If such protection constituted a legitimately serious bur
den for the prison, it would be free to make such a showing under the AD A's regulations by
arguing that the suggested modification to the prison routine was "unreasonable." See 42
U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1994); see also infra Section IV.A.
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view inmates' ADA claims, the standard has been met by arguments
that rely on stereotypes of a prisoner's disability, claims that prisoners
are ignorant and irrational, and focus on the security needs of the
prison without making a serious effort to accommodate the prisoner's
needs. The unfortunate outcomes of these cases should give courts
pause before implementing a standard that promotes results that stig
matize and restrict the rights of inmates due to their disabilities.

B.

A Misguided Focus on the Standard, Not the Disabled Inmate

Another practical result of the use of Turner in the review of pris
oner ADA claims is that the use of the standard often eliminates any
consideration of the prisoner's disability, the basis for his claim under
the ADA, from being used as a factor in the judicial determination of
that claim. In the cases examined in the Ninth Circuit, if a regulation
was deemed to meet the Turner standard, then the plaintiff's ADA
claim was terminated.U0 Although the prisoner's claim is brought un
der a statute protecting the disabled from discrimination, the court's
focus remains solely on the prison's justification of its regulation until
the case is dismissed. In these cases, no examination of the plaintiff's
disability is attempted, nor are the provisions of the ADA itself dis
cussed or implicated. Thus, only if a plaintiff were successful in
showing that a prison regulation was unrelated to a "legitimate pe
nological interest" would his or her ADA-related claim be examined
in any detail. And because that outcome would occur so infrequently,

110. There seems to be some confusion as to what would occur if a prison regulation did
not meet the Turner test. The Eleventh Circuit has assumed that if the Turner test was not
satisfied by a prison then the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act would be applied, and a
prisoner must also meet the standards of that Act to succeed in his claim. See Inmates of the
Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, No. 95-3402, 1996 WL 474106, at *11 (3d Cir. Aug. 22,
1996) vacated en bane Sept. 20, 1996; See Onishea I, supra note 29, 126 F.3d at 1335 (assum
ing that Turner would be used in conjunction with a test determining whether the plaintiff
could prove he or she was "otherwise qualified" under the Act). Alternatively, another
court believed that Gates stood for the proposition that Turner mandated the use of a stan
dard of "deliberate indifference to a serious medical need," which it noted was the same
standard that would be applied if the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act were not applied to
prisons. See Callaway v. Smith County, 991 F. Supp. 801, 806 n.4 (E.D. Tex. 1998) (citing
Farmer v. Brellllan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)). The Callaway court did not define whether such a
standard would be used in place of the four factors described in Turner, or applied after a
plaintiff met those factors. Yet it has been argued that given the generally objective presen
tation of the ADA's requirements, the use of "deliberate indifference" test would not be
appropriate. This is because the element of intent to be indifferent to the medical need,
which is crucial for that test, is likely not a required element for prevailing claims under the
ADA. See Robbins, supra note 6, at 91. Additionally, "deliberate indifference" is often an
important element in Eighth Amendment claims, which may not be subject to the Turner
test at all. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
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the practical outcome of invoking Turner in these scenarios would be
that the ADA would have strikingly little effect in prisons.
These results frustrate the intent of the ADA, as individuals are
discriminated against because of their disability and yet are often not
allowed to have that disability or the prospect of reasonable modifica
tion under the ADA emerge as a factor in the judicial process. This
outcome seems particularly unfortunate in light of the history of pris
ons, such as those in the Ninth Circuit, which have admitted to serious
violations of the rights of disabled prisoners.111 In the face of such
violations112 and the protection afforded by the ADA in general, a
standard of review that does not allow disabled prisoners the ability to
have the ADA's provisions considered by the court is a misguided
one.
IV. CONSIDERING TIIB PRISON CONTEXT AS PART OF TIIB
ADA'S CALCULUS
This Note has argued that, for a number of reasons, it would be in
appropriate to use the Turner standard in adjudicating prisoners'
claims under the ADA. As an alternative to that standard, Section
IV.A suggests that courts should analyze the justifications surrounding
a challenged prison regulation as part of its "reasonable modification"
deliberations under Title II of the Act.113 In this way, the statute could

111. See, e.g., Reynolds Holding, State Prisons Settle Disability Bias Lawsuit, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 12, 1998, at A20 (reporting that the state of California admitted violating the
ADA and the U.S. Constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishment by allowing a broad
range of abuses in its prisons, including the knifing and rape over a two-week period of a San
Diego prisoner with an IQ of fifty-six who complained to guards that he was in danger, and
the taunting and punishing of disabled prisoners by guards throughout the state's thirty-two
prison system); Jordan Lite, State Admits Disabled Prisoners Were Discriminated Against,
Vows Changes, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 12, 1998 at A4 (reporting that state prison
abuses also included having disabled prisoners given longer prison terms after not being as
sisted during hearings to establish their guilt or innocence); see also Maura Dolan, Judge Or
ders End to Brutality at High-Tech Prison, L.A. T.IMEs, Jan. 12, 1995, at Al (reporting that a
federal district judge determined that the state of California permitted guards at Pelican Bay
Prison to exercise " 'grossly excessive' force" and that the facility denied adequate medical
and mental-health care to inmates, leading to deaths).
112. It is of course true that a similar argument might be made regarding the abuses that
could arise in the use of the Turner test in cases involving infringement of prisoners' consti
tutional rights. It is not the intent of this Section to claim that those unfortunate conse
quences are not significant for prisoners as well. Yet aside from the previously noted rea
sons why the protection of inmates' statutory rights might differ from that afforded to their
constitutional rights, there is another reason why the results of prisoner ADA claims, gov
erned by Turner, might seem more egregious than those in the constitutional rights context.
The reason is that there is something abhorrent about the notion that a prisoner's disability,
which in many cases is already a severe physical and emotional burden, should be a signifi
cant justification as to why the inmate must be further penalized in the prison environment.
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1994) (stating under the Act that a "qualified individual
with a disability" is one "who, with or without reasonable modification to rules, policies, or
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provide a mechanism for courts to protect prisoners' rights while also
considering the needs of the correctional administration. Section IV.B
maintains that greater judicial scrutiny need not cause either tremen
dous organizational disruption or large financial burdens for prisons.
Instead, this Section provides evidence that prisons have adapted to
handle the needs of disabled prisoners and counters the notion that a
different standard of review will result in a large amount of damaging
prisoner litigation.

A

A Better Alternative to the Turner Standard

In light of the difficulties that accompany the Turner standard,
some courts have suggested that the ADA claims of prisoners should
be treated no differently than those of non-prisoners, without ad
dressing the reality of the claimant's incarceration.114 Yet this ap
proach would ignore the reality, often underscored by the Supreme
Court, that prisons have special security needs and that due to the na
ture of prison life, inmates simply do not have the same freedoms as
non-inmates do.115
A more appropriate solution would be for courts to incorporate
the unique circumstances of prison life into their determinations under
the Act. In particular, in deciding whether a reasonable modification
exists in a particular dispute, a deliberation required by the ADA,116
the court would be able to take into account concerns regarding secu
rity and order often raised by correctional administration.117
Unlike the deferential Turner standard, which only requires the
prison to make the minimal and often theoretical showing that a re-

practices ...meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the par
ticipation in programs or activities provided by a public entity").
114. See Raines v. Florida, 987 F Supp.1416, 1420 (N.D.Fla. 1997) (claiming that the
ADA should not be interpreted with any "added judicial gloss").
115. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); Procunier v.Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
404-05 (1974).
116. See supra note 11 3 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Amos I, supra note 86, 126 F.3d at 600 (noting that in determining what
type of scrutiny applies to violations of prisoners' statutory rights, courts will be outlining the
meaning of key ADA terms such as reasonable accommodation and undue burden); Craw
ford v. Indiana Dep't of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481, 48 3 (7th Cir. 1997) (arguing that when a
prisoner makes a claim, "a prison might be able to show that there was no reasonable ac
commodation that would have enabled the plaintiff to participate in the programs and activi
ties in question or that making the necessary accommodation would place an undue burden
on the prison system"); Niece v.Fitzner, 941 F.Supp.1497, 1510 (E.D.Mich.1996) (arguing
that the application of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act would not bring about "horrors"
and that a modification which would seriously jeopardize the security of other inmates or
prison officials would not be reasonable).
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striction serves a legitimate penological interest,118 this type of review
would be more rigorous in protecting the statutory rights of inmates
under the Act. This is because the ADA's key provisions do not focus
solely on the justifications offered by the prison managers, but instead
first seek to ensure equal treatment among disabled and non-disabled
inmates.119 This "reasonable modification" approach therefore forces
courts to look beyond the necessity of the restriction to the prison,
which is Turner's focus, and also seriously consider the depth of the
inmate's physical or mental concerns.
Additionally, by allowing for a balancing of the claims of prisoners
and prison administration, the ADA addresses the requirement of the
Turner and Procunier Courts that the difficulties of correctional ad
ministration and security be considered when reviewing inmate litiga
tion cases. In fact, the ADA not only allows for the consideration of
the concerns of the public entity, required by cases such as Turner and
Procunier, it mandates judicial consideration of interests particular to
the prison system.120 Therefore, the ADA would require that correc
tional facilities show that a particular modification sought by a dis
abled inmate is unreasonable in the context of prison life and there
fore not required under the Act. Moreover, in providing a centralized
set of regulations augmented by agency interpretations and other ju
risprudence surrounding the Act, Congress has given courts the tools
to make reasoned decisions regarding application of the ADA in
prison facilities.121 As a result, by addressing inmates' claims under the
ADA, courts would be focusing on the nature of an inmate's disability
while balancing those claims with the needs of correctional administra
tion, as the Act requires.
At least one commentator has suggested that judges will have little
difficulty in incorporating the ADA into the prison context because
they can simply use guidelines written by the Department of Justice
regarding the Act in addressing conflicts that arise in court.122 While

118. See supra Section III.A.
119. In requiring a determination of whether a proposed "modification" is "reason
able," 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2), the ADA looks closely at the nature ofthe disability at issue and
whether the prisoner's claim for relief can be acco=odated by means that do not subject
the prison to unworkable hardship.
120. See Amos II, supra note 30, 178 F.3d at 220; Onishea I, supra note 29, 126 F.3d at
1336. Moreover, it has been noted that the goals of prisons and those of statutes like the
Rehabilitation Act need not be very different - a viewpoint that considers such legislation a
benefit to the mission of prisons, not a hindrance. See Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 562
(9th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he Act's goals of independent living and vocational rehabilitation should
in fact mirror the goals of prison officials as they attempt to rehabilitate prisoners and pre
pare them to lead productive lives once their sentences are complete.").
121. See supra Parts II & III.
122 See Alexander, supra note 80, at 2280.
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these guidelines will no doubt be determinative in some situations,123
there will be others in which courts will have to make determinations
regarding what constitutes a "reasonable modification" that cannot be
so obviously addressed by such regulations.124 In some situations then,
courts will be the sole arbiters articulating solutions to prison prob
lems - a concern of the Turner court.125 Yet in clearly establishing
that prisoners should have the right to bring ADA claims, the Su
preme Court itself has indicated that to some degree courts will have
to act as mediator in these disputes.126 In these situations, due to the
nature of statutory rights and the results of the use of the Turner test
for disabled inmates, a court's role as mediator should be greater than
that required by Turner.121

It might be argued that the use of this judicial approach would be
different than the use of Turner, because courts would be equally def
erential to prison administration regardless of the type of review that
is used.128 Some courts have identified this concern without clearly an
swering it - while arguing that using the "reasonable modification"
test would not bring about "horrors" for prisons, they do not indicate
whether such a standard would likely be more prisoner-protective
than Turner.129 While it is no doubt true that some judicial decisions
using the ADA's text would not differ from outcomes that incorpo
rated Turner's standard, many others might differ significantly, due to
the increased emphasis placed on the nature of the disability under the
ADA.130 Unlike those cases using the Turner standard, with this ap-

123.

See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.

124. See Dalrymple-Blackburn, supra note 51, at 867 (noting that the ADA "invites ju
dicial interpretation by requiring public entities to implement 'reasonable' modifications
with little statutory guidance as to what constitutes an 'unreasonable' modification").
125.

See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).

126. See Yeskey II, supra note 8, 118 S. a. 1952, 1955 (1998); see also Amos II, supra
note 30, 178 F.3d at 222 ("Certainly tbere will be conflicts between the views of the DOJ and
prison authorities with respect to what is a 'reasonable accommodation,' but it is and always
has been the job of the courts to reconcile such conflicting interpretations by considering all
the unique surrounding facts and circumstances and attempting to balance the interests at
stake in making the ultimate statutory interpretation.").
127.

See supra Parts II-III.

128. See Inmates of the Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, No. 95-3402, 1996 WL 474106,
at *11 n.15 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 1996) vacated en bane Sept 20, 1996 (maintaining that although
a court can best express a degree of deference to prison officials through the framework of
the Act, that approach would very likely make little difference in practice from the use of
the Turner test).
129. See Niece v. Fitzner, 941 F. Supp. 1497, 1510 (E.D. Mich. 1996);
Westville Correctional Ctr., 103 F.3d 558, 561 (7th Cir. 1996).

see also Love v.

130. See supra Section III.B; see also Amos II, supra note 30, 178 F.3d at 228 (Williams,
J., dissenting) (arguing that by using the text of the Act instead of Turner to judge inmates'
ADA claims, courts would likely be using a procedure akin to intermediate scrutiny, which
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proach courts would immediately investigate the nature of the in
mate's disability and the alleged infringement on his or her rights. In
stead of dismissing a large number of claims based solely on the le
gitimacy of the prison's explanation,131 courts would be taking an
approach to review which incorporates the ADA's concerns along
with the prison's - an approach that could only give prisoners a
somewhat greater chance at a successful outcome.132
Moreover, even if a prisoner does not succeed in a claim where the
court uses the text of the ADA itself in its review, he or she has al
ready won a symbolic battle. While concrete relief may not arise from
the lawsuit, the inmate has forced the judicial and correctional systems
to confront his or her statutory claim head on, and at least consider
the seriousness of the claimed disability. In contrast, the Turner test
often allows courts to reject an inmate's ADA claim without ever con
sidering the nature of the disability.133
B.

Why a Higher Level ofScrutiny Will Not Substantially
Burden Prison Administration

If this type of approach to inmates' ADA claims is adopted, there
is evidence to suggest that prisons will be equipped to handle the re
quirements placed upon them by inmate litigation. Correctional insti
tutions would be able to survive a change to the review of ADA claims
in a manner that is slightly more inmate-friendly than the use of
Turner due to (1) the requirements of the Act itself, (2) the efforts of
prisons to adapt to the ADA, and (3) the creative techniques that such
facilities are increasingly using to support disabled inmates.
Some critics have claimed that prison populations contain a much
greater percentage of persons with an ADA-covered disability134 than

would require "searching judicial scrutiny of state law" (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. SW (1997))).
131. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
132 See Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1527 (11th Cir. 1991) (suggesting that the ef
fect of incorporating the Rehabilitation Act into decisions regarding prisons would be to
provide a "balance" between inmate and administration concerns that would sometimes re
sult in "reasonable accommodations" being made for prisoners). Moreover, when making
the argument that use of the ADA text would not prove an unreasonable burden for prisons,
some courts use only examples of situations where modifications "seriously" jeopardize
prison interests in describing the types of changes that those facilities would not be required
to make. See Onishea I, supra note 29, 126 F.3d at 1336; Niece, 941 F. Supp. at 1510. This
might indicate the courts' belief that situations where the modification is not insubstantial,
but does not carry such dangerous prison concerns, might offer the opportunity for a plain
tiff to be successful in court.
133. See supra Section ill.B.
134. The ADA defines a "disability" as a "physical or mental impairment that substan
tially limits one or more of the major life activities." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
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the population at large, implying that this large block of disabled pris
oners would flood the courts with ADA-related litigation after the
Yeskey decisionP5 Yet comprehensive studies delineating the extent
of the disabled prison population have not been done,136 and what con
stitutes a "disability" under the ADA is constantly being defined by
courts - at times in ways that significantly narrow the class.137 With
regard to physical disabilities, there is at least some evidence that dis
abled prisoners are in fact not extraordinarily numerous.138 Moreover,
at least one observer has noted that there has not been a barrage of
prisoner lawsuits since the ADA's passage.139 On the other hand, in
mates might be seen as more likely than non-inmates to claim a men
tal disability, which is covered by the ADA with some exceptions,140
135.

See Walters, supra note 11, at 8.

136. See, e.g., Camalian, supra note 16, at 292 ("The proportion of disabled inmates to
the general population has not been specifically determined . . ."); Elaine Gardner, The Le
gal Rights ofInmates with Physical Disabilities, 14 ST. LOUIS PuB. L. REV. 175, 176 (1994)
("There are few overall statistics as to the number of inmates with disabilities in our coun
try's prisons.").
137. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, High Court Limits Who Is Protected by Disability
Law, N.Y. TIMES June 23, 1999, at Al. For example, in a number of cases decided in June
,

of 1999, the Supreme Court held that employees with remediable handicaps cannot claim
discrimination under the Act See id. The Court believed that it was unlikely that Congress
intended for these individuals to be covered under the ADA, because the Act notes that 43
million Americans suffer from a disability, and if those with remediable handicaps had been
considered "disabled" by Congress, that figure would have ballooned to nearly 160 million
people. See id.
138. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 136, at 176-77 (reporting on a study that indicated
that an average of 0.46% of inmates in the federal prison system had "ambulation
problems," and that 0.46% of inmates used wheelchairs or had mobility problems); Maura
K. Ammenheuser, Prisons Accessible to Disabled, HERALD (Rock Hill, SC), June 19, 1998,
at Bl ("It's fairly rare to have a handicapped inmate, local jailers said. For example, the
York County [SC] Detention Center has handled about four in the last year, Short said.");
Richard Locker & Joan I. Duffy, Most Area Prisons Accessible to Handicapped, Officials
Say, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis, TN), June 17, 1998, at Bl (reporting that "very few"
of Arkansas's 10,692 inmates behind bars are handicapped, and that of Mississippi's 16,000
prisoners, the amount of disabled " 'would be a small percentage.' "); David G. Savage,
Disabilities Act Applies to Inmates, High Court Says, L.A. TIMES , June 16, 1998, at Al2
(reporting that of California's 157,000 inmates only about 1000, or 0.64% of the total prison
population, were disabled).
139. See Asseo, supra note 11 (quoting Marjorie Rifkin of the American Civil Liberties
Union's National Prison Project as saying that " '[t]here has not in fact been a flood of law
suits' by inmates"). It is difficult to gauge the effect that the introduction of a more favor
able standard of review of those claims would have on the filing of prisoner litigation.
140. The ADA definition for disability includes mental impairments. See 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2)(A) (1994). As with physical disabilities, the text of the Act provides no listing of
the mental disabilities covered by the legislation. See id. The Department of Justice has
concluded that the definition includes but is not limited to "[a]ny mental or psychological
disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness,
and specific learning disabilities.'' 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1994). No mention is made of person
ality traits and cultural disadvantages. See id.
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due either to the nature of their incarceration or a perception that
someone convicted of criminal acts is more likely to have some form
of mental instability.
Moreover, even prior to Yeskey, it had also long been argued that
if prisoners were allowed to bring ADA claims, prisons would face
substantial and potentially crippling financial and administrative diffi
culties.141 The Third Circuit believed that such a ruling might "place
nearly every aspect of prison management into the court's hands for
scrutiny" and make it not unfathomable that "courts will be used to
reconstruct cells and prison space, to alter scheduling of inmate
movements and assignments and to interfere with security proce
dures. "142 Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, argued that
such a ruling might require costly modifications of prison facilities,
which could curtail educational, recreational, and rehabilitative pro
grams and leave all prisoners worse off.143 These potential ramifica
tions have been described as having "serious implications"144 and the
potential to cause "chaos" for prisons.145 Furthermore, since the Su
preme Court decided Yeskey, some prisons have wondered if they can
survive the implementation of ADA-required alterations.146 These
fears would presumably be exacerbated after a decision holding that
those prisoner ADA claims would be subject to a more rigorous proc
ess of judicial review than that provided by Turner.
Yet there are many reasons why a reliance on the text of the Act
need not create instability for prisons, even if such a standard would
increase the total number of claims and the amount that are success
ful. First, the text of the ADA provides a number of hurdles for a
claimant in order to achieve victory in a suit. Not only must the in
mate prove that he or she has an ADA-covered disability, but the
141. Regardless of its truth, this is an argument that should be made to the legislature
and not to the courts. If Congress allowed for the ADA to apply to prisons as Yeskey held,
courts should not use these policy determinations to blunt the force of the statute. Congress
has the ability to reformulate the law if these potentially dangerous consequences do arise.
A court noted recently that Congress has to some degree already addressed the issue of
frivolous prisoner litigation by enacting the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). See Amos II, supra note 30, 178 F.3d at 216 n.4.
142. Yeskey I, supra note 7, 118 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 1997).
143. See Crawford v. Indiana Dep't of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481, 486 (7th Cir. 1997).
144. Amos I, supra note 86, 126 F.3d at 600 (quoting Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340,
1346 (4th Cir. 1995)).
145. Amos I, supra note 86, 126 F.3d at 591.
146. See, e.g., Thomas R. O'Donnell & Kirsten Scharnberg, Antiquated Lockups Burst
with Inmates, DES MOINES REG., Feb. 15, 1998 at 1 (claiming that partly because many Iowa
prisons are not meeting ADA standards, along with other problems, the future of many of
those institutions is in jeopardy); Jim Smiley, Crumbling Jail to Force One County's Hand,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 29, 1997, at 63 (reporting on a Nebraska prison that, due to
its age, was not compliant with the ADA and most likely could not afford the $500 a day fee
that other counties would charge to house its disabled prisoners).
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modification that she proposes to the prison regulation must be "rea
sonable."147 A strict statute of limitations applies to these claims as
well, as an inmate must file a complaint within 180 days from the date
of the alleged discrimination, or his or her suit will be barred.148 Addi
tionally, the Act does not require that all programs and services be
made available to disabled persons, meaning that while prisoners must
have access to programs, that access need not be located at the par
ticular prison itself.149
Second, there is some evidence that prison compliance with the
ADA need not be economically onerous if dealt with at an early
stage.15° Moreover, many prisons have reported that the Yeskey deci
sion did not have a debilitating impact for them because they had an
ticipated that the ADA applied in the prison context,151 and because a
great deal of new prison construction in the past few years has been
147.

See supra note 113.

148. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.170(b) (1998). But see Doe v. County of Milwaukee, 871 F.
Supp. 1072, 1078 (E.D. WIS. 1995) (ruling that the time bar for filings was based on state
Jaw).
149. See Robbins, supra note 6, at 83 & n.176 (noting that while the ADA does not re
quire modification at every location to permit access if access is available at alternative loca
tions, it does demand that participants not be required to attend the special "disability
accessible" location). Lastly, even if a claimant were successful, it does not seem that the
ADA allows for the success of punitive damage claims, which could open up far larger
monetary liability for prisons. See Harrleson v. Elmore County, 859 F. Supp. 1465 (MD.
Ala. 1994); Robbins, supra note 6, at 104.
150. See Alan Appel, Requirements and Rewards ofthe Americans with Disabilities Ac�
CORRECTIONS TODAY, Apr. 1995, at 84, 85 (finding that in two new facilities built in com
pliance with the ADA, the additional cost of compliance was 3.6% and 0.83% of the total
amount spent on construction); Darlene Van Sickle, Avoiding Lawsuits: A Summary of
ADA Provisions and Remedies, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Apr. 1995, at 104, 106 ("Fears that
complying with the ADA will break the bank are greatly exaggerated - at least at the preli
tigation stage.").
151. See, e.g., Jennifer Chorpening, Impact of Ruling Modes� DAYTON DAILY NEWS,
June 17, 1998, at B4 (" 'Basically for us [the Yeskey decision] will not have much impact,
since we've been dealing with the ADA as if it did apply anyway,' said John O'Malley,
administrative assistant to the warden at Dayton Correctional. 'It never was clear that it
didn't apply.' "); Harkin, supra note 66, at 3 (reporting that the director of the Iowa
Department of Corrections said "many corrections officials nationally had been expecting
Monday's [Yeskey] decision and were planning for it."); Locker & Duffy, supra note 138
("Officials at Arkansas's Department of Correction also concluded that the disabilities act
could apply to prisoners, and prepared handicapped accessible facilities."); Savage, supra
note 138 ("The [Yeskey] decision comes as no surprise to California officials, who were
ordered two years ago to comply with the federal Jaw. 'We already are complying with the
ADA and have made great strides,' said Kati Corsaut, a spokeswoman for the California
Department of Corrections in Sacramento."); Walters, supra note 11 ("Dave Whitcomb,
chief lawyer for Wisconsin's Department of Corrections, said the agency had been advised
that the Americans with Disabilities Act applied to the state's prisons, so the ruling would
not cause any major change. 'We assumed that Jaw applied to us,' Whitcomb said, so the
agency had formally been making special arrangements for disabled inmates on a case-by
case basis since 1991.'').

512

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 98:482

ADA-compliant.152 If a greater number of prisons are designed to ad
dress the needs of the disabled, the likelihood of a flood of litigation
seems somewhat reduced.
Third, state governments, individual prison facilities, and the
courts are increasingly implementing creative solutions that make
caring for the needs of disabled prisoners less costly and less disruptive
to prison administration, also reducing the possibility for ADA-related
claims. For example, some states provide their courts with significant
discretion regarding where to house disabled prisoners - allowing
them to place inmates in newer facilities that meet their needs while
older buildings are made ADA-compliant.153 States have also begun
to group prisoners with the same disability into one prison facility in
an effort to provide assistance to them more easily as required by the
ADA.154 Other options which have been tested are "compassionate
parole" structures providing for early release of disabled prisoners155
and the transferring of disabled prisoners to appropriate medical fa
cilities.156 Additionally, the judicial system attempts to keep the dis
abled out of prison as much as possible, often by sympathetically citing
the defendant's disability as a reason why no jail time should be im
posed for an offense which would otherwise compel incarceration.157
As this Section demonstrates, there are a number of reasons not to
expect that a more favorable standard of judicial review would result

152 See, e.g., Chorpening, supra note 151 ("Andrea Dean, spokeswoman for the Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, said all of Ohio's new prisons meet the act's
guidelines . • ."); Christopher Elser, Aging Behind Bars: Lengthy Jail Terms Have Left PA
with Costly Problem of Caring for Elderly Inmates, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Aug. 9,
1998, at Al; Locker & Duffy, supra note 138 (quoting the director of corrections for Shelby
County in East Memphis as saying, "'Any new construction is ADA-complaint' "); Harkin,
supra note 66, at 3 (reporting that the director of the Iowa Department of Corrections said, "
'We have been designing every new facility (in Iowa) with the appropriate openings, handi
capped parking and other improvements. In those facilities, we're pretty close to being up to
speed' . . . ") .
153.

See Harkin, supra note 66.

154. See Elser, supra note 152. It has been noted, however, that this practice has the
potential to raise Equal Protection claims if the caliber of the opportunities available in
these institutions vary identifiably as opposed to other corrections facilities. See Robbins,
supra note 6, at 108.
155. See Robbins, supra note 6, at 106. Yet the author recognizes that parole reform in
this context often must face a host of obstacles, such as opposition from communities who
pressure legislatures and prison officials to restrict parole opportunities. See id. at 106 n.320
(citing Lisa O'Neill, Rapist Fails Mental Test, Won't Be Freed, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1994, at
1 ).
156. See Robbins, supra note 6, at 107. The author further states that while the ADA
would bar such transfer if it achieved little more than convenient segregation of prisoners
requiring extensive treatment, such strategies could be beneficial because they would leave
societal concerns for security undisturbed and not result in a prisoner's transfer into the
community. See id. at 108.
157.

See id. at 105-06.

November 1999]

Prisoners' ADA Claims

513

in onerous economic and administrative burdens for prisons. These
legislative realities and administrative strategies will help correctional
officials guard against procedural chaos and more easily avoid the po
tential for a significant increase in prisoner claims, even if a more rig
orous standard of review is implemented in ADA-related cases.158
CONCLUSION
There is ample evidence that the Turner standard should not be
applied in all cases involving the review of prisoner litigation; it should
not be used where there are persuasive reasons supporting the imple
mentation of another mechanism to review such claims. The judicial
history of the Turner standard itself, the flexibility of statutory rights
generally, and the specificity that accompanies statutes such as the
ADA, all lead to a conclusion that the Turner standard is not appro
priate for the review of inmates' statutory suits under the ADA.
Moreover, the results of using the Turner standard would preclude
inmates from relief in all but the most horrible cases and divert atten
tion from the claimants' disabilities. These consequences demonstrate
that, courts should instead use the "reasonable modification" provi
sion of the ADA in reviewing such claims. This result would, as man
dated by the Supreme Court, provide disabled prisoners with an even
handed adjudication of their discrimination claims, while also
respecting the legitimate security concerns of prison administration. It
would ensure that Ronald Yeskey's victory truly had meaning for
those Americans with disabilities who live in the state prison system.

158. The aftermath in Pennsylvania of the Yeskey decision itself serves as an instructive
example of how some of the mitigating factors mentioned here can help protect the state
from unmanageable consequences of decisions favorable to prisoners' ADA claims. In
Pennsylvania, the state has made sure that the most recent prisons it has built comply with
the ADA, see Elser, supra note 152, which should help mitigate the cost of future compli
ance with claims like Ronald Yeskey's. Pennsylvania had seven handicapped-accessible fa
cilities in mid-1998, and new construction of such facilities was deemed not to be necessary.
See Schatz, supra note 4. Additionally, the state has been trying novel ways to manage dis
abled prisoners' needs, by beginning to group prisoners with the same disability at specified
institutions. See Elser, supra note 152. Additionally, another mitigating factor, which mate
rialized in Pennsylvania after the Yeskey decision, is the ability of the state's citizens to seek
some redress in the state legislature. Governor Tom Ridge signed a bill into law making it
more difficult for prisoners to file lawsuits by, among other things, providing the courts with
an expanded ability to dismiss those suits that a judge considers frivolous. See Schatz, supra
note 4. As long as such legislation does not hinder prisoners from bringing valid ADA
claims, it is another means that can be used by the state to ensure that prisoner litigation
does not spiral out of control.

